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Subject*:*

"*The EU candidacy of Turkey: implications and challenges of the 'Europeanization' process for the Greek Turkish relations*"

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ABSTRACT:

The Helsinki Summit decision in December 1999 launched a new era in the Turkish political life. In Helsinki, EU member states, including some big players and Greece, revised their attitude towards Turkish' prospective membership and recognized Turkey as a "candidate country". The accession negotiations started officially on the 3rd October 2005, despite some ambiguities.

Turkey has adopted, within a short period of time, a series of reform packages so as to achieve full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. In this respect, the key role of the Justice and Development Party, as well as the importance of the pro-european forces in the country must be underlined. Clearly, Turkey is going through its biggest modernization process since the Kemalist era.

Within this framework, the article examines the impact of the EU-Turkish negotiations for the bilateral Greek-Turkish relations. Based on the method of event data analysis, the article develops an Event Coding System comparing the course of European-Turkish relations with that of the Greek-Turkish relations. The Presidency Conclusions of the European Councils and key facts in the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey in the period 1996-2005 are coded and analysed.

On the basis of the intended event data analysis, the article argues that the relations between Greece and Turkey progress when the EU-Turkish relations also advance and vice versa. Consistent with the analytical framework of neofunctionalism, we distinguish "low" from "high politics" issues, thus, grasping in more concrete terms the observed advances in the bilateral relations. A kind of spill over from "low" to "high politics" in the Greek Turkish bilateral relations is expected whenever the EU-Turkish relationship is improving and Turkey comes closer to its long-term accession goal.

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The post-Helsinki era: implications of the "Europeanization" process for Turkey

Turkey aspiring to join the EU faces massive challenges. The Turkish EU candidacy hinges on several important factors, set out in the Helsinki communiqué. Turkey must undertake internal democratic reforms, with particular regard to the rule of law, human rights and minorities' issues and it should resolve all bilateral issues with Greece before 2004. This implies the involvement of the International Court of Justice[2].

As a matter of fact, Turkey clearly showing its willingness to become a member of the European Union started adopting reform packages, aiming to comply with the Copenhagen criteria.[3] However, the reform process could be intensified only after three years of divisive debates and resistance to reforms from "Euroskeptic" circles in Turkey. It was the decisive outcome of the November 2002 elections that brought in a government with a strong will to meet the political criteria that made this change possible. The new government accelerated the reform pace: it lifted the death penalty, it introduced cultural rights for ethnic minorities (especially Kurds), expanded various democratic freedoms, it took legal and administrative measures to curb endemic torture, and institutional arrangements to reduce the influence of the military in Turkish politics. Euroskeptics resisted reform at every stage. Now that formal reforms have been adopted, their implementation becomes crucial.

The modernization process, accelerated by these series of reforms, has serious implications for the country itself. *Pleno sensu*, one can mainly differentiate between three levels of impact:

a) the internal political impact: this takes the form of a compulsory impact and has primarily been directed at Turkey's political leadership. It includes a number of

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[2] The Greek government has long held this to be the legitimate forum for dealing with Turkey's political or territorial claims, regarding the easternmost islets of the Aegean and the demarcation of the continental shelf.

[3] At the Copenhagen European Council summit in June 1993, the criteria for future membership in the European Union were determined as: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and the protection of minorities; 2) existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; and 3) ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. The first set is known as the "political criteria" and candidate countries are required to have met them in order to start accession negotiations. Each autumn, the European Commission prepares progress reports in respect to these criteria. It is at the recommendation of the Commission that the European Council decides whether a candidate can start negotiations, and whether at the conclusion of these negotiations it can be admitted as a member country. For membership to take place, the approval of the European Parliament is required as well that of the national parliaments. Some member countries may also hold referenda. (See: Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, June 1993)

internal reforms which Turkey must meet. In this respect, Turkey prepared a national program outlining the reforms to be made in the short and long terms. In the summer of 2001, the Turkish parliament finally adopted a series of critical amendments to the Turkish constitution to facilitate political reforms that meet the Copenhagen criteria. The government's role in this process is decisive, as well as the pressure of the pro-european forces in the country. However, as the December's 2004 Progress Report on Turkey of the EU Commission affirms, "further steps need to be taken."[4]

b) the economic implications: The EU accession process has the potential to transform Turkey's economy. In the wake of the economic crisis and recession of 2001, a number of policy measures were taken in order to tackle with the causes of financial and fiscal instability, to foster quick recovery, and to create the conditions for further integration in the European Union.[5] However, there remain a number of challenges to putting Turkey on a sustainable path of strong economic growth. West European doubts about Turkish membership would be weakened if Ankara just got on with reforms, without much prodding from Brussels. Turkey could also impress its critics by improving the functioning of the Customs Union, which many in the EU regard as a test case for full membership.

c) the civil society and the cultural level: the third level of EU impact in Turkey is directly related to Turkey's wider civil society level. A new pro-european civil society is emerging. This is an important bottom-up approach that could help weaken the role of the military. Furthermore, the EU influence also contributes to the change of traditional identity scripts: in a constructive way, European identity starts to flourish parallel to the Turkish and the Muslim identity.[6] Moreover, the EU has offered financial aid and assistance in order to strengthen the civil society in the country.

Apart from the above, the European candidacy of Turkey may have serious implications for the external relations of the country. According to Prof. Paul Kennedy of Yale University, Turkey is one of the nine "pivotal countries" in the world that will have an impact on our globe's future.[7] As a member of NATO and a

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[4] See: "2004 Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession", Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, October 2004, p.163 ff

[5] For a detailed analysis of the Turkish economy, see: OECD Economic Surveys, Annual report for Turkey, Vol. 2004/15, December 2004.

[6] A high percentage of Turks have voiced their support for the EU. Many younger Turks (particularly in Istanbul) conceded that their country's quest to join the EU had brought about reforms. (See: Pace M., "EU-Turkey Relations", University of Birmingham, Presentation delivered at the BRITAIN and GREECE: 5th Annual Bilateral Conference, Hydra – Greece, 8 -10 October 2004)

[7] According to Professor Kennedy, "a large population and an important geographic location are two requirements" to be a "pivotal state." See: Akinci U, "Interview with Prof. Kennedy, Turkish Daily News, 6. January 1996 (http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr, downloaded: 09.01.2006)

candidate for EU membership, Turkey has a significant stake in the future shape of the transatlantic partnership, as well as the stability and security of the region. This new strategic environment necessitates a reassessment of Turkey's relations with Europe in a multidimensional context moving beyond Turkey-EU bilateral relations, but also the US and the other Muslim countries of the region. Of course, future prospects for Turkey-EU relations depends both on what Europe might look like in the new century, and on what kind of Union will emerge after enlargement.

A methodological approach: the event data analysis

Foreign policy analysis developed at about the same time as the behavioural approach in political science. The objective of the behaviouralists was to study political behaviour using systematically measured variables, statistical techniques, and unambiguously stated hypotheses. In some areas of political science, the behaviouralist studies used measurement techniques that had been developed earlier.

Event data analysis is a formal method of measuring the phenomena that contribute to foreign policy perceptions. Event data are generated by examining newspaper reports on interactions of nation-states. There are two major ways of coding political events.

The first approach is to *classify events and scale* (weight and accumulate) them in some manner to reflect their importance or intensity. The event data is then *scaled* by assigning each reported interaction a numerical score or a categorical code. By this, each event can be represented on a scale, where the most severe negative actions receive the lowest negative mark; the most constructive actions receive the highest positive mark. When these reports are averaged over time, they provide a rough indication of the level of cooperation and conflict between the two states.[8]

In the second approach, one can code events by type. The event data coding consists of the *frequency of events* of each type, such as the number of coups for Argentina.[9] These codings may differ only in their definitions, their scope, level of

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[8] See: Schrott Ph., "Event Data in Foreign Policy Analysis", University of Kansas, October 1993

[9] The second method of event data coding according to the *frequency of events* of each type is the approach of various event data analysis projects such as the CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) project and the WEIS (World Events Interaction Survey) project. (see: Rummel R.J., "Understanding conflict and war: War, Power, Peace", Event Data: Bases of Empirical Conflict Analysis, Sage Publications, California, USA, 1979 & http://www.ku.edu/~keds/)

4

classification, and sources.[10]

According to the first methodological approach of *scaled event data*, key events of cooperation and progress in the Turkish-European relations parallel to key facts in the relations of Greece and Turkey are examined, in order to evaluate the course and progress of the EU-Turkey and Greece-Turkey relations respectively. Furthermore, the Event Coding System developed, enables the comparison and correlation of the progress of the Turkey-EU negotiations with the course of the Greek-Turkish relations.

In this respect, the events of conflict and cooperation are scaled from +2 to -2, where the positive mark indicates constructive actions in the relations of Turkey with Greece and the EU respectively (e.g. the moments of cooperation in the relations of Greece and Turkey and positive events and progress on the European prospect of Turkey). On the other hand, the negative mark is assigned to negative actions (e.g. conflict and opposing attitudes in the Turkish-Greek relations or the negative result of negotiations with the EU). The corpus examined remains small –due to the limitations of the current research- and refers to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Councils that concern Turkey and the key facts or important events of conflict or cooperation between Greece and Turkey from 1995 to 2004. The perception and differentiation between cooperation and conflict is made according to the following taxonomy:

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[10] To both methodological approaches have been credited advantages and problems in both frequency and scaled event data. Frequencies stay close to events, minimize assumptions, and allow the data themselves to show their patterns. But, frequencies give all events of a certain type equal weight and their quantitative analysis is a confession of substantive ignorance. Scaled events enable qualitative insight to play a role and weight events of the same type by their political significance. However, this enables subjective bias and a priori beliefs to influence the results.

5

TABLE.1[11]:

Taxonomy of Conflict and Cooperation

TERM	MEANING
conflict	opposing vectors of power; the conflict space, structure of conflict, or balancing of powers; latent or manifest conflict
conflict space	latent space of possible conflicts; realm of potential opposing vectors of power
structure of conflict	latent opposing attitudes
situation of conflict	latent opposing interests
Conflict Behavior	manifest balancing of powers; cooperative (contractual) events and compulsory behavior
conflict behavior	compulsory behavior
conflict process	the development of a conflict through its various phases
cooperation	cooperative structures or flows; familistic or contractual (excluding cooperative events) behavior
cooperative flows	aggregate and repetitive behavior involving the movement of people, goods, services, or aid.
cooperative structures	the cooperative framework of behavior established by agreement (e.g., number of treaties, international organizations, diplomatic recognitions)
cooperative events	specific contractual events (e.g., signing a treaty, offering aid, making a concession)
cooperative behavior	flows, structures, or events

History & Event Data Analysis of key facts of the Turkish-European Relations[12]

Turkey's quest to become part of Europe and, later, the European Union has been a long one. In 1949, Turkey became a founding member of the Council of Europe, and joined NATO in 1952. Turkey's relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC) started in 1959, when the government applied for associate membership. This application resulted in the Ankara Association Agreement on 12 September 1963. In 1970, the Additional Protocol was signed, envisaging a 22-year transitional period that would end with the establishment of a Customs Union. Yet Turkey's relationship with the European Community (EC) experienced problems from the mid-1970s onwards because of Turkey's internal economic problems and political instability. In 1987, transition to democracy and economic liberalization led Turkey to apply for membership. In its opinion of 17 December 1989, the Commission concluded that Turkey was not ready to be a member of the European

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[11] Source: Rummel R.J., "Understanding conflict and war: War, Power, Peace", Event Data: Bases of Empirical Conflict Analysis, Sage Publications, California, USA, 1979, table 4.4. (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/WPP.TAB4.4.GIF)

[12] For a detailed historical overview of the European-Turkish Relations see: www.mfa.gov.tr & http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/key_events.htm

6

Union for economic, political, and social reasons.

After the end of the Cold War, most of the 1990s were a very difficult period for EU-Turkey relations. Nevertheless, in spite of considerable resistance from human rights circles and the European Parliament, in the end both sides succeeded in signing the Customs Union Agreement of January 1996. In Turkey, this new treaty was very much perceived as a vital step towards eventual full membership. However, at the Luxembourg summit of the European Council in December 1997, Turkey was *not* included in the list of candidate countries for the next round of enlargement. In protest, and due to the considerable governmental and public disillusionment, the Turkish government went as far as breaking off political dialogue with the EU, and refused to attend any EU meetings.

A breakthrough came at the December 1999 EU summit in Helsinki when Turkey was granted candidate status. In November 2000, the EU adopted the Accession Partnership document, which listed the reforms that Turkey, was expected to adopt in order to be able to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. On March 2001, the EU Council of Ministers adopts the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership and the Copenhagen European Council of the December 2002 resolves that if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotiations. Meanwhile, EU leaders agree to extend and deepen co-operation on the EC-Turkey Customs Union and to provide the Turkish government with increased pre-accession financial assistance. In May 2003, the EU Council of Ministers decided on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions of the Accession Partnership with Turkey. In October 2004, the Commission presents its "Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress towards accession" along with its paper "Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective". In December of the same year the European Council defines the conditions for the opening of accession negotiations. Indeed, on the 03rd October 2005 the Council adopted a Negotiating Framework setting out the principles governing the negotiations followed by the formal opening of Accession negotiations with Turkey.

The course and progress of the EU-Turkish relations can be followed on the basis of the relevant references in the Presidency Conclusions documents of the European Councils. In the following table 2, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Councils in the period 1995-2003 are cited and coded s explained above:

TABLE 2: CODING OF KEY EVENTS OF TURKISH EUROPEAN RELATIONS

Date	European Council: Presidency conclusions[13]	Justification	Mark
June 1995	Cannes European Council	"The Union <u>intends to implement the customs union with Turkey</u> as part of a developing relationship" (from 01.01.1996 the Customs Union enters into force)	**+1**
June 1996	Florence European Council	The Council "<u>stresses the priority</u> it attaches to the strengthening and deepening of relations with Turkey", no progress	**0**
December 1997	Luxembourg European Council	"Turkey is eligible for accession" and a "European Strategy for Turkey" is adopted. Though, Turkey is <u>not granted the candidate status</u> and is <u>breaking off political dialogue</u> with the EU.	**-2**
June 1998, December 1998	Cardiff European Council, Vienna European Council	Both Councils underline the importance of the "European Strategy for Turkey", <u>still no candidate status</u>	**-1**
December 1999	Helsinki European Council	"Turkey recognised as <u>candidate country</u>"	**+2**
December 2000	Nice European Council	"The European Council welcomes the progress made" and "highlights the importance of <u>Accession Partnership document</u> agreed at the Council meeting on 4 December 2000"	**+1**
June 2001, December 2001	Gothenburg European Council, Laeken European Council	The two Councils affirm the progress made by Turkey; however, further steps need to be taken.	**0**
December 2002	Copenhagen European Council	"if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the <u>EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey</u>"	**+1**
June 2003, December 2003	Thessaloniki European Council, Brussels European Council	The European Councils "<u>welcome the commitment</u> of the Turkish government to carry forward the reform process", significant progress is realised. However, further sustained efforts are needed.	**0**
December 2004	Brussels European Council	"Turkey <u>sufficiently fulfils</u> the political criteria to <u>open accession negotiations</u> on 3 October 2005"	**+2**

The course of the Turkish-European relations, epitomized in the above table, could then be presented in diagrammatic form as follows:

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[13] The European Council Conclusion documents that are not included in the table have either not a reference to Turkey or are reaffirming the previous citations. For all the European Councils' Presidency Conclusions see: http://europa.eu.int/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm

DIAGRAM 1:

Progress of the European-Turkish relations

Course of the EU-TR relations ■   ■ "European Councils' Conclusions"   ▬▬ Trendline for the course of the EU-TR relations

With the exception the Customs Union Agreement of January 1996, the European-Turkish relations until 1999 are characterised by negative results and a significant deterioration. As shown in the diagram above, the Helsinki Summit marks a significant change, thus improving the bilateral relations and creating a positive climate. After the December of 1999, the trend of the EU-Turkey relations moves steadily towards a positive level. Of course, the pick up point in the progress of the bilateral relations in the last years is the formal opening of the negotiations on the 3rd of October 2005.

History and Event Data Analysis of key facts of the Turkish-Greek Relations

For many decades, relations between Greece and Turkey have been strained and limited to a thin thread of formal contacts between the two countries. Captured in a "prisoner's dilemma" the two countries have viewed each other with mistrust and prejudice. For both countries, the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996 marks the culmination of this strategic disorientation. However, the Imia-Kardak crisis resulted in an increase in the "civic diplomacy" or "second-track diplomacy". Unfortunately, the Imia-Kardak crisis of 1996 was not the only crisis that left a deep impact on the Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era. Two other significant crises were over the

9

S-300 missiles[14] and regarding the Turkish capture of the Kurdish insurgent leader Abdullah Öcalan.[15] Many expected Greek-Turkish relations to sour following the Öcalan affair in 1999 but, similar to the previous crises, this problem also led to the emergence of new possibilities in Greek-Turkish relations.

The devastating earthquakes in both Turkey and Greece in 1999 and the Greek support for the Turkish candidacy in the Helsinki Summit, led to the rapprochement of the two societies and provided a stimulus to the intense diplomatic efforts for the improvement of bilateral relations.[16] In Helsinki, Greece draws a new strategy on the perspective of the Turkish entry in the European Union. This strategy represents a significant shift from the long-standing Greek policy.[17] According to Wendt, there are two preconditions for critical strategic rethinking to take place: Firstly, there must be a reason to think of oneself in new terms. Secondly, the sanctions of rethinking must not be greater than its rewards.[18]

In this respect, Greece's support for Turkey's EU candidacy is based on the conviction that Turkey will be motivated by the prospect of future membership to work on domestic political and economic issues, and to act as a responsible member of the European community. Greek policymakers came to the realization that Greece's security and interests lay not in a "clash of civilizations" with Turkey, but rather in entering into a dialogue with a "Europeanized Turkey." In Papandreou's words, "It is in Greece's interests -more than any other member of the EU- that Turkey moves closer to Europe. Turkey's approach to Europe will be an important factor in the creation of a climate of cooperation, which is an essential pre-condition if we hope to solve the differences between us."[19]

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[14] The S-300 crisis erupted after Athens decided to station anti-aircraft missiles in Cyprus to safeguard the aerial corridor from Greece to Cyprus. Turkish perception of these missiles as offensive weapons ushered in another stressful period in Greek-Turkish relations. (See: Lambrides P., The S-300 Missiles Crisis Revisited: A Structural Realist Approach, EKEM, July 2005, http://www.ekem.gr/archives/2005/07/the_s300_missil.html)

[15] Another crisis in Greek-Turkish relations broke out after the February 1999 capture of Abdullah Öcalan, head of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). It became clear that Öcalan had received material assistance and a safe haven from some official circles in Greece. Turkey accused Greece of giving support to terrorism, and Greece's government also faced severe domestic criticism.

[16] Following the earthquakes, Turkey and Greece also co-sponsored a joint resolution on the establishment of a "Joint Standby Disaster Response Unit" (www.mfa.gov.tr)

[17] As George Papandreou states, "Helsinki was...a culmination of the new phase in Greek foreign policy." See: Papandreou G., "Revision in Greek Foreign Policy," Western Policy Centre, January 2000. <http://www.papandreou.gr/february2000/wpc_jan2000.html>

[18] After claiming that the actors engage in self-reflection in case these two conditions are present, Wendt analyzes in his work Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of "New Thinking" as an example of this process. (See: Wendt A., "Anarchy is what states make of it: social construction of power politics." *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, 391-425)

[19] See: Papandreou G., Statements following a meeting with representatives of Greek NGOs who offered humanitarian aid to Turkey after the earthquake, 03.09.1999.

Greece's support for Turkey's EU candidacy is based on the conviction that Turkey will be motivated by the prospect of future membership to work on domestic political and economic issues, and to act as a responsible member of the European community, as well as solving the bilateral problems with Greece. According to the Greek perception, a "Europeanized" Turkey is less dangerous.[20] For Greece, recent positive developments of rapprochement reflect an innovative new approach to the vexed question of relations with Turkey. The emphasis now is on positive engagement and realistic objectives, through multilateral organisations as well as bilateral initiatives. The key events in the Greek-Turkish relations from 1995 to 2004 are organised chronologically and coded in the following table:

TABLE 3: CODING OF KEY EVENTS OF TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

| Date	Key facts and events in the bilateral relations[21]	Mark
March 1995, June 1995	- Greece lifts the veto against the for the establishment of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EU (+1) - The Turkish Parliament puts forward the "casus belli", in case of expansion of the Greek territorial waters (-1)	**0**
January 1996	Imia-Kardak crisis	**-2**
January 1997, December 1997	- Purchase of a Russian S-300 air defence system by Cyprus heightens tensions in the region, leading to the S-300 missiles crisis - The Luxembourg European Council rejects the Turkish demand to recognise it as a candidate country for EU accession	**-2**
June 1998	In a NATO initiative in Brussels, Greece and Turkey reaffirm the Moratoria Papoulia-Gilmaz of 1988	**+1**
February 1999	The Öcalan affair	**-2**
December 1999- 2000	- Greece removes the "veto" against Turkey in the Helsinki European Council and Turkey is granted the candidate status. - rapprochement period, "earthquake diplomacy"	**+2**
December 2001	Tries for the settlement of Cyprus issue, rapprochement period, Confidence Building Measures (CBM) adopted.	**+1**
March 2002	First explatory contacts between officials of the two countries to exchange views on the whole range of Aegean issues and on possible means of their peaceful settlement, Confidence Building Measures (CBM) adopted.	**+1**
October 2003	Turkish Foreign Minister Abdulah Gül visit in Athens to review all aspects of the Turkish-Greek relations and in particular the process of dialogue and cooperation between Turkey and Greece. Further Confidence Building Measures (CBM) adopted	**+1**
March 2004 May 2004, December 2004	- Burgenstok meeting for the settlement of Cyprus issue (March) - Visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Mr. R.T. Erdoğan in May - Support for the opening of negotiations of Turkey in the European Council of Brussels	**+1**

<http://www.mfa.gr/gpap/september99/ngoturkey_e3999.html>

[20] See: Kotsiaros Ath., "The change of the Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey: the Greek official political discourse", Institute for European Integration and Policy, Athens, January 2006, p.13.

[21] The cases of the violations of the Greek airspace are not included in the present Event Coding System as they consist of a common practice of the Turkish side intending to the revisionism of the status quo in the Aegean. Moreover, the high frequency of the cases contributes to downgrading their importance and analytic value.

11

Based on the Event Coding, the progress of the Greek-Turkish relations is presented in the following diagram:

DIAGRAM 2:

Progress of the Greek - Turkish relations

Legend: ◆ Key events in the GR-TR relations — ■— Course of the GR-TR relations —— Linear (Course of the GR-TR relations)

Comparing the Turkish-European relations with the Turkish Greek relations

One source of influence at EU's disposal to impact border conflicts is its power to force or entice states into resolving their disputes by offering membership or threatening sanctions to this status. On the case of the Greek-Turkish conflict, the impact of such carrot/stick policies of the European Union has been temporary and limited until 1999, but much stronger recently.

It can be inferred from the literature that when either Greece or Turkey had a pending membership application with the EEC/EC/EU, its policymakers were careful to restrain themselves from further escalating crises, and worked towards improving bilateral relations.[22] In the 1990s, as Turkey sought to develop closer institutional

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[22] An example of this restrained behaviour can be found in the way how the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis chose to handle Greek-Turkish relations following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. His decisions clearly reflect "the deep impact that the prospect of EU accession exercised on post-1974 Greek foreign policy." Similarly, when the 1976 Aegean continental shelf crisis erupted right after the filing of the Greek application for membership in the EEC in June 1975, Karamanlis chose to deal with the crisis by taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice, rather than by military means. A similar process can be observed during Turkey's application for EC membership in 1987. Equally with Greece, Turkey's reaction to the second crisis over the continental shelf in 1987 was restrained as it occurred right before Turkey filed its application for membership in the EC. Aware that improved relations with Greece were necessary to prevent a Greek veto and to strengthen Turkey's membership prospects in the EC, Turkey's Prime Minister Özal

relations with the EU first through a Customs Union agreement, and later by seeking candidacy, the EU repeatedly reminded Turkey that strengthening its links with the EU depended on the resolution of its disputes with Greece. Until 1999, except for temporary and tactical improvements in bilateral relations, the EU's carrot/stick instrument of granting/withholding membership status failed to bring about a resolution of the Greco-Turkish conflicts (Diagram 3).

However, the fundamental change in the course of the bilateral relations occurs after 1999, when the membership carrot regained its credibility and thus its power to influence Turkey, with the declaration of Turkey's candidacy in the Helsinki Summit decision. Apart from this, the legitimisation of alternative policies at the elite level, the activities of civil society and the promulgation of alternative discourses have also contributed to the rapprochement of Turkey and Greece.[23] The Helsinki European Council decision to grant Turkey candidacy status is promoting a growing recognition that a European identity will entail for Turkey a different kind of relationship with Greece[24], and has paved the way for the perception of EU norms and procedures as a neutral basis to build a cooperative relationship with Greece.[25]

In fact, in this period, significant bilateral cooperation has been witnessed in various secondary issues, such as tourism, energy, illegal migration, and culture has been marked by communications that recognise the other as like self.[26] Clearly, the tendency for cooperation and avoidance of tension between Greece and Turkey is higher as Turkey moves closer to the European Union (Diagram 3).

In the following diagram, it is attempted to combine the Turkish progress towards the EU with the course of the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey based on the Event Coding of the European-Turkish and Greek-Turkish relations respectively:

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adroitly defused the crisis and actively pursued dialogue with Greece. (See: Rumelili B., "The European Union's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict: A Review of the Literature", Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, No. 6, University of Birmingham, January 2004)

[23] See: Rumelili B., "The European Union's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict: A Review of the Literature", Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, No. 6, University of Birmingham, January 2004

[24] See: Rumelili B., "Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU", *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (2), 2003, p.213-248.

[25] See: Rumelili B, "Turkish-Greek Relations: Enabling EU Impact", Paper presented at the *CEEISA/ISA International Conference*, Budapest, Hungary, 26-28 June 2003.

[26] See: Rumelili B., "The European Union's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict: A Review of the Literature", Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, No. 6, University of Birmingham, January 2004

DIAGRAM 3:

Comparing the course of the European-Turkish relations with the course of the Greek-Turkish relations based on Event Data

- ■— Course of the EU-TR relations
- ■— Course of the GR-TR relations
- ■ "European Councils' Conclusions"
- ■ Key events of the Greek-Turkish relations
- —— Trendline for the European-Turkish relations
- —— Trendline for the Greek-Turkish relations

As seen in the diagram above, the last years that Turkey is moving closer to the European Union, the pick-up points and the tensions in the bilateral relations are less frequent. It is observed that the relations between Greece and Turkey progress when the EU-Turkish relations also advance. Provided that the prospect of the Turkish accession in the EU remains as achievable goal, it is high possible that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and cooperation will advance.

One of the central arguments about the Greek-Turkish rapprochement has been that it was a product of what is usually called "civic diplomacy," "public diplomacy," or "earthquake diplomacy" initiated after the earthquakes by the peoples of both countries and flourished after 1999 and the Helsinki Summit. According to this argument, the citizens of the two countries showed their preference for friendship and peace, and the political leaders just followed after the "public's wish" in their diplomatic initiatives. The move toward rapprochement is well-rooted in a process of re-evaluation or redefinition of political and strategic interests, a process initiated before the natural disasters made it more palatable to the Greek and Turkish publics.[27]

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[27] See: Kotsiaros Ath., "The change of the Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey: the Greek official political discourse", Institute of European Integration and Policy, Athens, January 2006, p.9

According to the theoretical framework of the neofunctionalism, the role of the non governmental actors is decisive for the creation of a climate of cooperation in issues of "low politics". The latter contributes to positive results for the actors involved and may lead other actors also to cooperate in other areas of "low politics". Possibly, the cooperation in "low politics" can create a certain spill over in areas of "high politics". The goal of the actors each time involved is to maximize the benefits of cooperation in the new areas. The results of this procedure are the legitimization of the central institutions and the distribution of new competences to them to coordinate the cooperation.[28]

Indeed, after the earthquakes and mainly after Helsinki, the Greek and Turkish governments were active and innovative in working to legitimize their foreign policy practices in the eyes of their domestic constituencies through a very successful mobilization of the public. This process included not only a public legitimization of a new policy course but also a process of demystifying the "enemy". Bilateral meetings and exchanges of views between the respective Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the two countries laid down the political ground for promoting and reinforcing ongoing cooperation and dialogue process. High level contacts and visits have also been instrumental in keeping the momentum of this process.[29] In this new era, a series of mechanisms have been established between the two countries, such as the exchange of regular mutual visits between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs; exploratory contacts regarding the Aegean issues; regular political consultations; proceedings of the working groups under the auspices of Steering Committee; and talks on Confidence Building Measures (CBM).[30]

The exploratory contacts between the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, launched in March 2002, paved the way for the first time after so many years, to exchange views on the whole range of Aegean issues and on possible means for their peaceful settlement. Political consultations enable Turkey and Greece to explore out each other's views and positions on various regional and international issues. As a

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[28] See: Tsinisizelis M., "The completion of the European Union", Themelio, Athens, 1999, p. 36-41

[29] For example, the visit of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to Greece on 6-8 May 2004 constituted the first visit of a Turkish Prime Minister to Greece after sixteen years (see: www.mfa.gov.tr)

[30] See: Diamantikos K, Lambrides P., "Seeking peace in the Aegean: A review of Confidence Building Measures and Security in the Greek-Turkish relations", Institute of European Integration and Policy, Athens (http://eeep.pspa.uoa.gr/upl/aegpeace.pdf)

result, in the course of last five years, 25 agreements (including the protocols and memorandums of understanding) were signed between Turkey and Greece.[31]

Within the framework of the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) Process, which is instrumental in reinforcing the mutual trust required to settle security related issues between the two countries, 11 CBM have been adopted so far. The meetings of the Turkish-Greek Joint Economic Committee and the Turkish-Greek Business Council provide opportunities to explore the possibilities of expanding economic ties. The prevailing constructive atmosphere has also positive implications on the development of closer ties and achievement of concrete results in various fields such as tourism, combating crime, environment, trade and economy, energy and transportation. The scope of cooperation in the field of culture has also been expanding. Especially, non governmental organizations took the lead in the intensification of the people to people ties and cultural exchanges between the two countries. The friendly relations between Turkey and Greece based upon mutual respect, understanding and trust have importance not only for the economic welfare and political stability of the two countries but also for the enhancement of peace, stability and security in the region.

Conclusion

Comparing the course of the European-Turkish relations with the course of the Greek-Turkish relations we conclude that the relations between Greece and Turkey progress when the EU-Turkish relations also advance and vice versa. The expectation of the Greek policymakers that an EU-Turkey rapprochement will be improve Turkey's stance with regard to the Greek-Turkish relations (a perception which generated the fundamental change of the Greek Foreign Policy towards Turkey in the Helsinki Summit) seems to have been so far fully justified. Bringing Turkey closer to Europe already contributes to fundamental reforms in the country towards further economic development and democratization, as well as to more cooperation between Greece and Turkey mainly in "low politics". But, the established cooperation between the two countries in "low politics" has already caused a spill over in "high politics" issues. Within this framework, the role of the two governments can be decisive, but so

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[31] For a detailed list of the signed Agreements see: http://www.mfa.gr/english/the_ministry/eny and http://www.greekembassy.org

16

will the involvement of Greek and Turkish non-governmental organizations, the private sectors, local government authorities, and individual citizens.

As a result of the Event Data Coding, a further rapprochement between Greece and Turkey and a certain normalisation of the bilateral relations can be predicted, in case that the Turkish accession remains an achievable goal. The EU's decision of the 3rd October 2005 to open the negotiations with Turkey will undoubtedly move the two countries closer to each other. In any case, the two countries have gained a long period of a mutual non-confrontational conduct of affairs.

17

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