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Title: The Impact of the European on the Unresolved Difference over the Name between the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Greece<sup>1</sup>.

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## Introduction

The issue over the name of the state of Fyrom is already 16 years old. Since its birth in 1991 many attempts have been made for its resolution but without any spectacular results. In a way this controversy between Athens and Skopje has evolved to an identity difference between the two states and their people<sup>2</sup>. This identity difference however has a special characteristic. From one hand, is not a difference between “us” and the “others” per se, as traditional identity approaches would argued. Indeed, is an identity difference between “those” who believe “that they” are and the “others are not” the true Macedonian identity holders and vice verca. From the other hand, despite of this difference, both states since 1995, when the Interim Accord was signed, have established a wide area of co-operation. In addition, Greece supported Fyrom’s bid for EU membership. As a result, the Summit of EU leaders in Brussels<sup>3</sup> on December 15-16/2005 granted FYROM candidate status for EU membership in line with November 9/2005 recommendation of the European Commission (EC)<sup>4</sup>. The EC

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is based on an unpublished work that the Author has conducted with Panos Lambridis “The Contemporary History of the Greek National Issue: The Skopjan Issue during the last Decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and in the Beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> .

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed analysis of the identity based differences see, Mediatin Theory and Identity Dispute:Lessons from Regional Ethnic Conflicts, Conference Sponsored by the Wayne State University. Program of Mediating Theory and Democratic Systems, February, 2<sup>nd</sup> 1998, <http://www.mtds.wayne.edu/identity/index.htm>

<sup>3</sup> Brussels European Council 15/16 December 2005, Presidency Conclusion [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/87642.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/87642.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> Commission Opinion on the application from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for membership of the European Union {SEC(2005) 1425 } {SEC(2005) 1429 }

recommendation makes specific reference to the unresolved difference over the name between FYROM and Greece and asks both countries to find, through negotiations, a commonly accepted solution for the benefit of regional co-operation and good neighbourhood<sup>5</sup>.

This paper, by examining recent normative and empirical discourses, intends to argue that the prospect for EU membership for Fyrom constitutes a unique opportunity, probably the last, for the resolution of the name-identity-difference between Fyrom and Greece. In particular, it will be argued that the prospect for a common European future between Athens and Skopje in combination with the economic interdependent relations that have developed between the two countries over the last 12 years hold the potential of eventually leading to the creation of a security community between the two countries and their people, which will be based, as the theoretical basis of security communities requires, to a common identity. In this way, the name difference will be denigrated to an issue of minor importance and therefore it will be easier to be resolved.

In order to support this argument, firstly, the historical background of the issue and how it was developed to an identity based difference, will be presented. Secondly, the post-Cold war bilateral relations between Fyrom and Greece will be summarized and its shortfalls will be pointed out. Thirdly, by presenting the theoretical basis of security communities it will be shown that the prospect for European Union membership for Fyrom constitutes the core around which a common European Identity between Greece and Fyrom can be developed. Then a conclusion should be drawn, where the theoretical and policy implications of this argument will be presented.

### The historical background of the Macedonia Issue

The Macedonian issue, of which the difference over the name is part, is not a new one. Its origin dates back to 1878 when the Treaty of Berlin (July 1878) abolished the Treaty of San Stefano (1877), by which the geographic area of Macedonia was given to Bulgaria<sup>6</sup>, and returned it to Turkey. The multi-ethnic, multicultural and multi-religious character of the Macedonian region was actually the point of friction between Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, in an era that was characterized by the rise of aggressive nationalism<sup>7</sup>. By this

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<sup>5</sup> *ibid*

<sup>6</sup> See James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question", pp. 475-485, in *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 3, 1992, p. 477. See also, Misha Glenny, "The Macedonian Question", in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halvershon (eds), *International Perspectives of the Yugoslav Conflict*, Macmillan Press, London, 1996

<sup>7</sup> See especially, Pashalis Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans", in *European History Quarterly*, No.19, 1989

time, Macedonia had a mixed of populations of, Bulgarians, Greeks, Turks, Albanians, Serbs, Jews, Armenians and others. Those people were following different religions and they had cultivated different cultural identities. During the 1880s and 1890s the Macedonian region witnessed a peaceful cultural competition between Greece and Bulgaria in religious and educational terms. At the same time a kind of liberation guerilla warfare was initiated by Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbian teams against the Turks. Sometimes fighting was also taking place among those groups. In 1893, the Macedonian question witnessed another development. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was formed which promoted the idea of an autonomous Macedonia within a Balkan Federation. The founders of this organization were of a Slavic origin<sup>8</sup>. However, its effort had no lack given that most of the constituting units of the population of Macedonia had a national identity. In 1885, Bulgaria violated the Treaty of Berlin and resorted to expulsions against the Greek populations. From 1900 to 1907 the Greeks who lived in Macedonia revolved, unsuccessfully though, against the Turkish rule. Very soon, the Balkan countries, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece, realized that a successful overthrow of the Ottoman rule from the Macedonia area would be achieved only if they were united. As a result, in 1912 a Balkan Entente was formed between those states. The Balkan Entente attacked the Ottoman Empire and won the war. As a consequence of this war, the Peace of London was signed in 1912 by which the Macedonia territory became under Serbian, Greek and in a smaller percentage Bulgarian rule. Bulgaria felt disappointed with this partition and as a result launched an attack against Serbia in 1913. Greece, Romania and Montenegro formed a coalition with Serbia which achieved the defeat of Bulgaria. As a consequence, the Peace of Bucharest was signed in August 1913 by which Bulgaria lost all of its Macedonian territory. As a consequence, after the end of WWI northern Macedonia was confirmed as part of Serbian territory and southern Macedonia as part of Greece. In addition, with the Lausanne Treaty, Greece and Turkey agreed in an exchange of populations. Under this agreement, most of the Muslims that were living in Macedonia were exchanged with Greeks that were living in Asia Minor. Due to this exchange, the south Macedonia acquired national homogeneity. The northern Macedonia maintained its multi-ethnic character and some IMRO elements. The remains of IMRO were politically exploited

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<sup>8</sup> John Belchem and Richard Price (eds) ,The Penguin Dictionary of Nineteenth-Century History, Penguin, 1994, pp. 356-357.

by Communist International which in 1934 accepted the existence of a “Macedonian Nation”<sup>9</sup>.

In 1944, Tito established the “Peoples Republic of Macedonia” as a constituted state of the Yugoslav Federation. Following in that way the desires of the communist international. Since then the bilateral relations between Greece and Yugoslavia especially during the period 1950-1956 were not calm. The “Socialist Republic of Macedonia”, several times, had made reference to the creation of the “Macedonia of the Aegean”. A statement, that was indicating territorial claims against the Greek part of Macedonia. The bipolarity of the Cold War, however, contributed greatly to a Greek-Yugoslavia détente. What is of great importance, however, is that for almost 50 years a group of people of Slavic origin was taught to call itself Macedonians. As a result, a national identity has been formed. Due to the Slavic origin of these people, the only justification to call themselves Macedonias was geography and not history. Even with this way of thinking the Greeks who were living in the bigger part of Macedonia were a Majority and also are the true descendants of Ancient Macedonias given that the Macedonians were considered Greeks in Ancient Greece as well. This is how the Macedonian issue turned into an identity difference.

### **The post Cold War bilateral Relations between Fyrom and Greece**

The post Cold War bilateral relations between Fyrom and Greece can be divided in three distinctive phases. The first phase covers the period from December 1991 to September 1995, when the Interim Accord was signed. The basic feature of this phase is the tentative relations between Athens and Skopje. It can be characterized therefore as zero-sum thinking phase giving that the mentality of the foreign policy of both states was a maximalist one. The second phase covers the period from the signing of the Interim Accord to December 2005 when Fyrom was given a candidate status for EU membership. The third phase covers the period from 2005 to the present day and its completion is expected to take place with the accession of Fyrom to the EU.

The first phase of post Cold War relations between Fyrom and Greece- The phase of tentative Relations

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<sup>9</sup> Aris Xatzigeorgiou, “How the Macedonian Issue was Born”, Eleftherotypia, (Greek-Newspaper) 14/11/04

The end of the Cold War, however, has produced an entirely new security environment in Europe in general and in the Balkans in particular. The disintegration of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia revitalized, the so well curbed during the Cold War, nationalism of its consisting and neighboring states<sup>10</sup>. In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. The parliament of “The Socialist Republic of Macedonia”, after multi-party elections, that took place for the first time since its foundation, in December 1991, declared its autonomy. However, according to this declaration the “people of Macedonia” maintained the right to declare their independence from the federation when the conditions were suitable<sup>11</sup>. Moreover, article six of this declaration was authorizing the parliament to take the necessary measures for the protection of the “Macedonian minorities” that were living outside the country. This particular article alerted the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

When the government of the until then Socialist Republic of Macedonia announced its intention to launch a referendum for the declaration of its independence the Greek Foreign Minister Antonios Samaras sent a letter to his EU counterparts by which he was expressing his great concerned of this development and the developments in the Balkans in general<sup>12</sup>. On the 8<sup>th</sup> September 1991, a referendum took place in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia with a turn out of 75.7%. The relatively low turn out for a referendum was due to the abstention of the large Albanian minority which was demonstrating against the Federal Constitution of 1989. The federal constitution of 1989 was recognizing the Social Democracy of Macedonia as the nation state of the “Macedonian people”. On the 17<sup>th</sup> of September 1991 the government of Skopje declared the independence of the “Republic of Macedonia”. As a consequence the government of Athens made a complaint to the OSCE general assembly in Moscow in 1991 by stating that the use of the term Macedonia in the name of the state of Skopje is a clear indication of territorial claims against Greece. Kiro Gligorof, the President of the “Republic of Macedonia” sent a letter to the Greek Government in Athens stating that his country has not any territorial claims against Greece. Meanwhile, the then European Economic Community (EEC), had decide to form a select committee of legal experts, known as “the Batender Committee” from the name of its president, that was going to set up the

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<sup>10</sup> See Sotiris Rizas, “Nationalism in the Balkans”, in Kathimerini, (Greek-Newspaper), 2/01/05, p.7

<sup>11</sup> See, Aris Xatzigeorgiou, “How the Macedonian Issue was born”, in Eleftherotipia (Greek Newspaper), 15/02/04, σ. 13

<sup>12</sup> See Aristotelis Tziabiris, International Relations and the Macedonian Issue, (In Greek) ELIAMEP, Athens, 2003, p.46

legal criteria for the recognition of the new Yugoslavic democracies.. On the 16<sup>th</sup> of December 1991 the Foreign Ministers of the twelve EEC member states met in Brussels and decided to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. As far as the issue of the independence of the “Republic of Macedonia” was concerned the last paragraph of the aforementioned decision was referring to the concerns of Greece over this issue. In particular, the EEC asked assurances from the government of Skopje that there is no any territorial claim against any of its neighbors, it requested the ending of propaganda against Greece and that it would stop the use of a name that was implying territorial claims<sup>13</sup>. As a result, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of December 1991 the Parliament of “The Republic of Macedonia” sent a letter to the Batender Committee by which was presenting a blueprint for some amendments in its constitution that Greece had asked. Also on the 11<sup>th</sup> of January 1992 the government of Skopje made a commitment to cease any propaganda against Greece. As a consequence, the report of the committee was positive for the recognition of the “Republic of Macedonia”<sup>14</sup>. Meanwhile, the government of Skopje submitted an application for entrance in the UN with the International Name “Republic of Macedonia”.

On the 14<sup>th</sup> of February the Greek Government organized a huge demonstration in Thessalonica. A year later another demonstration was organized in Athens<sup>15</sup>. The participation of the Greek people in those demonstrations was impressive. Demonstrations were also organized in all over Greece and the media were offering full coverage. Moreover, the political importance and implications of those demonstrations worth to be presented. What was actually happening in Greek foreign policy at that time was that a grassroot movement was created to be used as an instrument of foreign policy. This movement, however, in the short term demonstrated to the international community how the whole issue had insulted the Greek Civil society and the national pride of the Greeks. In the long term, though, those demonstrations in combination with the wide and extensive coverage by the media had a boomerang effect in several aspects. Firstly, the public acquired an indirect but effective influence in an issue of foreign policy. In particular, since the public adopted the maximalist position, initially supported by the Greek Government, that the ‘Republic of Macedonia’

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<sup>13</sup> For the full text of the resolution of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, 16/12/1991, see Ioannis Valinakis and Sotiris Dalis (eds), “The Skopje Question: Official Documents 1990-1996” (in Greek), second edition, Athens 1996, pp.147-148

<sup>14</sup> L. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, second edition, Westview, Boulder, London, 1995, p.235

<sup>15</sup> John Valinakis and Sotiris Ntalis, The Macedonian Issue, (in Greek), ELIEAMEP, Sideris, Athens, 2001, p.4.

should not be recognized with a name that will comprise the word Macedonia or its derivatives”, became a co-policy maker<sup>16</sup>. As a result, any government that would have demonstrated willingness to compromise would have to face its electorate punishment. Secondly, and most important, the difference over the name evolved, once again, to an identity based difference between the Greek Macedonians who were perceiving themselves as the true Macedonias and the Slav-Macedonias who were using the term Macedonian to refer mostly the geographic area they have been living since the Sixth Century b.C<sup>17</sup>. The Greek public perceived this claim for recognition by the government of Skopje with the name “Republic of Macedonia” not only as a threat to their identity and their patrimony but also as a threat towards the territorial integrity of their country.

On the 17<sup>th</sup> of February 1992 at the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EEC, the foreign Ministers of Denmark and Holland exercised pressure on their Greek counterpart for the recognition of the “Republic of Macedonia”<sup>18</sup>. The Greek Foreign Minister announced in public this pressure and next day declared the commencement of a boycott against Danish and Dutch products. An internal crisis within the EU, due to the Macedonian Issue, was obvious. Athens was becoming a part of the problem and not a part of its solution.

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of April the Portuguese presidency of the EU, after a EU foreign Ministers meeting at Lisbon on the 17<sup>th</sup> of February presented a plan, that was named after is Prime Minister “Pinheiro Plan”, that was consisting of two texts for the resolution of the issue. The first was a convention for the mutual recognition and the inviolability of the borders. The second was a letter from the Government of Skopje to the government of Athens by which Skopje “was renouncing any territorial claims and preventing activities against Greek Macedonia, repudiating the related actions of the former Yugoslavia, pledging itself not to resort to or tolerate such activities in the future. It was also promising to neither make minority-related demands, nor to foster the idea of a unified Macedonia state in the future”<sup>19</sup>. The Pinheiro

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<sup>16</sup> See the text of the petition that was signed by the participants of the Thessalonica mass rally. The text can be found in Aristotelis Tziabiris, *International Relations and the Macedonian Issue*, (In Greek) ELIAMEP, Athens, 2003, p. 70

<sup>17</sup> The Former President of Fyrom, Kiro Gligorov, admits that the citizens of Fyrom are not descendants of Alexander the Great and that they have a Slavic origin. He also states that this Slavic nation settled in the area that was called Macedonia during the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Century b.C. Kiro Gligorov, *Memoirs*, Greek Translation from the Slav-Macedonia, Athens, 2001

<sup>18</sup> James Eyal, *Europe and Yugoslavia :Lessons from a Failure*, Whitehall Paper, Royal United Services Institute, (RUSI), London, 1993, p.61

<sup>19</sup> Evangelos Kofos, “The Unresolved Difference over the Name: A Greek Perspective”, pp.125-224, in Evangelos Kofos and Vlasid Vlasidis (eds), *ELIAMEP*, 2003, p. 134

plan was proposing “New Macedonia” to be the name of recognition of the self-called “Republic- of Macedonia”. Greece rejected this plan because it has not been satisfied with the name proposal. On the 13<sup>th</sup> of April the Greek Foreign Minister Antonios Samaras was replaced. Prime Minister Mitsotakis took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A governmental crisis, in other words, took place in Greece as a result of the Macedonian issue.

On the 27<sup>th</sup> of June 1992 the EU Summit in Lisbon decided not to recognize the new state if in its appellation there is the term “Macedonia”. Now it was time for the Foreign Minister of the so called “Republic of Macedonia” to resign and few days later the Kilioutsef government followed suit. Obviously, the issue of the name had evolved in a very important foreign policy issue able even to cause internal political instability in both countries due to the zero-sum thinking approach in their foreign policy. The most worrisome crisis was of course that in FYROM due to the Civil War that was taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a consequence, the decision of Lisbon was opposed by the US. A month later, on the 6<sup>th</sup> of August 1992, Russia recognized FYROM as the “Republic of Macedonia”. The British foreign office also announced that the Lisbon decision should be re-examined. As a result, encouraged by these new developments FYROM adopted the sun of Vergina, an undisputable Greek-Macedonia symbol, for its official flag. Obviously, this took place for negotiation reasons. The government of Athens in response on the 21 August 1992 imposed an oil embargo on FYROM. The relations between FYROM and Greece reached an impasse.

On the 7<sup>th</sup> of April 1993 the UN Security Council decided the entrance of the Former Yugoslav Republic in the UN with the provisional name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” but without the right to fly the flag bearing the “Sun of Vergina”<sup>20</sup>. Moreover the Secretary General was authorized to take on initiative over the resolution of the name. As a result, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen took on another initiative for the resolution of the name issue. The final proposal was “Nova Makedonija”, the Pinheiro proposal, in other words, in a Slavic version. “Nova Makedonija”, as the international name of the state, was indicating the Slavic origin of the citizens of FYROM, making in that way an effort to satisfy the identity, cultural and historical objections of the Greek side. On the 27<sup>th</sup> of May Greece rejected this plan<sup>21</sup>. On the 10<sup>th</sup> of June 1993 the United States

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<sup>20</sup> Security Council Resolution 817/1993

<sup>21</sup> As, Evangelos Kofos point out, “the issue (texts of this plan) returned to the forefront in 1994-1995, when the Vance-Owen draft (excluding the paragraphs about the name) was used as the basis for the Interim Accord of September 1995” Evangelos Kofos, “The Unresolved Difference over the Name: A Greek Perspective”, pp.125-224, in Evangelos Kofos and Vlas Vlasidis (eds), ELIAMEP, 2003, p. 130

decided to send troops to Fyrom. In other words, this decision, constituted an unofficial recognition of Fyrom by the US. In October 1993, there was a governmental change in Greece. The Andreas Papandreou government decided on the 4<sup>th</sup> of November 1993 to cease all the negotiations with Skopje. By the end of December of the same year most of the EU member states established diplomatic relations with Fyrom and on the 18<sup>th</sup> of February 1994 the US recognized Fyrom. The Greek government responded by imposing an economic embargo on Fyrom<sup>22</sup>.

The signing of the Interim Accord between Fyrom and Greece –The cooperation phase

After six years of tentative relations Fyrom and Greece reached an “Interim Accord” in 1995 in New York. The Interim Accord was consisting of two parts. The first part was dealing with the name and the second part was dealing with other bilateral issues that were concerning the bilateral relations of those states. According to the first part of the Agreement both parts within a period of seven years had to find a mutually acceptable solution for the resolution of the name difference. Meanwhile Fyrom was going to be the temporal name of the former Yugoslav Republic. In other words, the interim accord bypassed the name difference and put it off for the future. According to the second part of the Agreement, Greece withdrew the embargo that had imposed to Fyrom and recognized to Fyrom a nation state status. The government of Skopje, on the other hand was forbidden to use the sun of Vergina for its flag and of interfering in the internal Affairs of Greece. Greece also maintained its right to object any intention on behalf of Fyrom to enter any international organization by using any other name than Fyrom<sup>23</sup>. The US and the EU were appointed as mediators for the resolution of the name difference.

After the signing of the Interim Accord the relations of both states were improved drastically. Co-operation, especially on the economic field, between the two countries took place and a series of other bilateral agreements were signed.<sup>24</sup> In 1996, Fyrom established contractual agreement with the EU by signing the agreement to be eligible for the

<sup>22</sup> Dimitris Maxairidis (ed), FYROM, (in Greek) Balkan Observatory, ISTAME, 2000, p.34

<sup>23</sup> See Hristos Rozakis, “Political and Legal Dimensions of the Interim Accord of New York between Fyrom and Greece, ELIAMEP, (in Greek), working paper, Sideris, Athens, 1996

<sup>24</sup> According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs 21 bilateral agreements have been signed between Fyrom and Greece after the signing of the Interim Accord, Their Ratification by the Greek Parliament, however, is still pending due to the outstanding difference over the International name of Fyrom. [www.yplex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr](http://www.yplex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr) 16/03/07

PHARE programme. For the implementation of the PHARE programme Fyrom cooperated closely with Greece<sup>25</sup>. In 1997 Fyrom also signed the Cooperation Agreement with the EU and in 2000 the Stabilisation and Association Agreement<sup>26</sup>. Until 2004 however, no solution over the name issue was found. The mutual beneficial relations of Fyrom with Greece though, expanded the duration of the Interim Accord, since neither of the signatories parts abandon it. On May 2004, the UN through its mediator, Mathew Nimich, took over another initiative for the resolution of the name issue. This initiative also did not succeed. Meanwhile the US recognized Fyrom with its constitutional name, as Republic of Macedonia.

### **The European Membership Prospect for Fyrom and its impact on the unresolved difference over the name.**

On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 2004, Fyrom submitted its application for EU membership. As was stated above, the European Council decided on the 16<sup>th</sup> of December to grant candidate status for EU membership to Fyrom. Greece did not object such a development on the contrary it supported it. The government of Athens, made clear, however, that it will not consent to the Entrance of Fyrom to the EU or NATO, with the name “Republic of Macedonia”. It is the contention of this paper, that the European Prospect for Fyrom is a unique and probably the last opportunity for the resolution of the sole remaining difference between Fyrom and Greece. Moreover, this identity based difference, will be resolved with the creation of a common European identity between the peoples of both countries. Security community building therefore, which eventually leads to the creation of a common identity, is the way forward.

The Theoretical Basis of Security Communities

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<sup>25</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the\\_former\\_yugoslav\\_republic\\_of\\_macedonia/eu](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/eu) 17/03/07

<sup>26</sup> *ibid*

Richard Van Wagenen, first used the concept of the security community in the early 1950s. However it was not until the publication of Karl Deutsch's and his associates study that the concept of security communities received its first full theoretical and empirical treatment<sup>27</sup>. Deutsch et. al define a security community as 'a group of people that has become integrated to the point that there is a 'real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their dispute in some other way'<sup>28</sup>. According to their study, there are two kinds security community, amalgamated and pluralistic. An amalgamated security community is when 'two or more previously independent units merge into a single larger unit with some type of common government after amalgamation'<sup>29</sup>. In contrast, a pluralistic security community preserves the legal independence of the separate participant governments<sup>30</sup>. For Deutch, pluralistic security communities are the result of interactions and institution building between states that leads to the creation of a common identity'<sup>31</sup>.

Such a conception of international politics seemed idealistic in the shadow of super power competition during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, however there is a renewed interest in security community theory. The work of Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett 'Security Communities'<sup>32</sup>, constitutes a serious effort to amend and apply Deutsch's conception in post Cold War era. By focusing on the study of pluralistic security communities, Adler and Barnett, recognise that the 'Deutschian contribution is to highlight that states can become embedded in a set of social relations that are understood as a community, and that the fabric of this community can generate stable expectations of peaceful change'<sup>33</sup>. Adler, extends Deutsch's concept of pluralistic security communities by arguing that: 'Such communities are socially constructed 'cognitive regions' or community regions' whose people imagine that with respect to their own security and economic well-being, borders run, more or less, where shared understandings and common identities end'<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> Karl Deutsch, et. Al, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University Press, 1957

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. p.5

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p.6

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p.5

<sup>31</sup> Ibid

<sup>32</sup> Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, (ed), *Security Communities*, Cambridge University Press, 1998

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p.6

<sup>34</sup> Emanuel Adler, "Imagined Security Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations", pp. 249-277, in *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.26, No.2, 1997. p.250

In other words, Adler sees deficiencies in Deutsch's argument, that the achievement of security communities is taking place through intersocietal transactions. As Rosamond notes 'Deutsch became preoccupied with the achievement of security communities through intersocietal transactions. Furthermore, he was convinced that these transactions could be measured and quantified. So his attention was focused on measurable indices of communication such as international phone calls and the cross border traffic of tourists'<sup>35</sup>. The post Cold War interest in security communities, Adler argues, should focus not on this but on the sociological origins of transactions and the process of social learning that lead to the creation of a common identity<sup>36</sup>. Consequently, Adler and Barnett define a pluralistic security community as 'a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change'<sup>37</sup>.

Adler and Barnett distinguish two kinds of pluralistic security communities, tightly coupled and loosely coupled. This categorisation of security communities is taking place according to 'their depth of trust, the nature and degree of institutionalisation of their governance system and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it'<sup>38</sup>.

Having presented the conceptual basis of their version of security communities, Adler and Barnett, move on to develop a three-tier model of the development of security communities<sup>39</sup> that corresponds to a three-phase model: Nascent, Ascendent and Mature<sup>40</sup>.

The first tier deals with the creation of conditions that result in the emergence of security communities. Those conditions may be a combination of changes in technology, demography, economics the environment, the existence of external threats and changes in the interpretations of social realities. As a result co-operation takes place between states as states think that they can cope better with those changes or threats if they co-operate with each other. In this initial stage a mutual identification is not expected to be created, instead this phase constitutes the basis for a more pleasant and frequent future interaction because it helps states to realise the benefits of co-operation.

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<sup>35</sup> Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, Macmillan, 2000, p.168

<sup>36</sup> Emanuel Adler, "Imagined Security Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations", pp. 249-277, in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol.26, No.2, 1997, p.250

<sup>37</sup> Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities", pp. 29-65 in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, (ed), *Security Communities*, Cambridge University Press, 1998

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* p.30

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* pp.37-39

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 50-55

This leads to the second tier where a more institutionalised co-operation takes place and is defined by organisations, transactions and social learning. The most important aspect of this tier is the fact that states and their peoples become involved in multiple social interactions that shape their surrounding environment. These dynamic interactions provide the conditions under which a collective identity and mutual trust can be formed which are prerequisites for the dependable expectations of peaceful change.

In the third tier, both mutual trust and collective identity are formed and lead to the creation of 'dependable expectations of peaceful change', defined as 'neither the expectations of nor the preparation for organised violence as a means to settle interstate disputes'<sup>41</sup>. The third tier is the end point of security community building since member states perceive war among them as unthinkable as a result of the shared identity and trust that exists amongst them.

### **How can Fyrom's candidacy for EU membership lead to the creation of a common identity between here and Greece?**

Bearing in mind the three-phases theoretical model for the creation of a security community it can be argued that those phases can be applied to the post 1995 Greek-Fyrom relations. In other words, Greece and Fyrom realised that the zero-sum competition that took place between them between 1991 and 1995 was not for their interests because both of them lost in diplomatic, financial and political terms. They realised therefore that a relationship of co-operation is far more advantageous than a relationship of conflict. As a result they initiated cooperation between them. The signing of the 21 bilateral agreements bears testament to this. The signing of this agreements can be considered as the completion of the first tier-phase for the creation of a security community.

As was stated above the first tier is important because it helps the participants to realize the benefits of co-operation and therefore leads them to the expansion of their co-operation. This can be seen to the Greek-Fyrom cooperation. According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greek exports to Fyrom reached 407,62 millions US dollars in 2005 compared to 382,35 millions in 2004. An increase of 6.6% took place. At the same time, Greek imports from Fyrom witnessed a 63,5% increase from 150,42 millions dollars in 2004 to 245,9 millions dollars in 2005. Simultaneously, Greek direct investments is the highest in Fyrom and amount to 800 millions

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid .p.6

dollars and 20.000 jobs. What can be seen here is that a lot of elements of economic interdependence have been already in place in the relations between the two countries<sup>42</sup>. As Bruce Russett states: “In that way complex interdependence relations are part of a wider variety of international interactions that help the building of a common identity between people”.<sup>43</sup> In other words, the citizens of Greece and the citizens of Fyrom will realize that their economic cooperation is part of their economic security and therefore will have to preserve it<sup>44</sup>. To put it differently, the fact that the citizens of both states will adopt a common security identity, at least in financial terms will gradually lead to the adoption of a common civic identity. Within this context the European prospect for Fyrom will be another element of a common identity. Greece and Fyrom are able to base their relations on a common European future. The fact that both states can benefit from their participation to the EU in financial, political and military security terms will also be conducive towards the creation of a common definition of security and the formation of a common identity. As Adler and Barnett argue, “The desire of a common future can be equally important as the existence of a common threat for the initiation of the creation of a security community”<sup>45</sup>. Fyrom has already been greatly benefited from the EU. Between 1992 and 2005 Fyrom has benefited from European Community Assistance of approximately 767 millions Euros. Furthermore, since 31 December 2005, the European Investment Bank has supported projects in Fyrom with funds amounting to 163 million Euros<sup>46</sup>. In other words, the EU, has also established interdependence relations with Fyrom and in a way has gained leverage over the domestic developments and the foreign policy of the country.

Within this context the only way for Fyrom and Greece, not only to resolve the name difference but also to bypass their identity conflict is to walk together the European road. The creation of a European identity between them, which is going to be characterised by common economic,

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<sup>42</sup> [www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr](http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr) 16/03/07

<sup>43</sup> Bruce Russett, “A neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, interdependence, and International Organizations in Building Security Communities”, pp.368-394, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, (ed), Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.372

<sup>44</sup> James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, “Economic Security and the Problem of Co-operation in post Cold War Europe, pp. 221-237, in Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, 1998

<sup>45</sup> Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, pp.29-65 in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (ed), Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.51

<sup>46</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the\\_former\\_yugoslav\\_republic\\_of\\_macedonia/eu](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/eu) 17/03/07

security, political and ideological terms, will undoubtedly denigrate the name issue to an issue of secondary importance and will eventually resolve it. As a result, both states have to demonstrate political will to reach a compromise. Greece, should abandon its maximalist position that it will not recognise Fyrom with a name that includes the word Macedonia or its derivatives. Fyrom, from the other hand, should also abandon its maximalist position of the “double name”, which requires to be called Fyrom by Greece, in its bilateral relations and Republic of Macedonia by the international community. The elements that unite both states and their people are much more than those that keep them apart. A mutually acceptable solution can be reached if both states believe in a common European Future.

The EU, therefore, must play an important role towards this direction. By using its “Power of Attraction” to use Gabriel’s Munuera term<sup>47</sup>, the EU can exercise some pressure, firstly towards Fyrom for the resolution of the name issue with Greece. It must also promote the cooperation between those states by encouraging them to play a shared role in its policies in the area of the Balkans. Brussels, should also offer funding for activities that promote the Civic Dialogue between the people of both states and contribute to the increase of interactions between them.

Greece, on the other hand, as the theoretical model of security communities requires, since is already a member of a security community like the EU, has to reproduce the epistemic and normative expectations of the community<sup>48</sup>. In other words, Greece should not use its EU membership to put forward a maximalist position but it should also demonstrate, as it already has by giving its consent to the acquisition of EU candidate status by Fyrom, political will for a fair compromise. Peace and stability in the Balkans serves also its own interests not just the interests of the EU. In that way, the European Prospect for Fyrom can be turned into a unique opportunity for the resolution of the name issue of the state of Fyrom.

### Conclusions

In conclusion it can be argued that the proposal for the creation of a security community between Fyrom and Greece can provide the basis for the resolution of the name difference between the two states. The role of the EU towards this direction and especially the EU membership prospect for Fyrom is of fundamental importance. In this way, at least this is the contention of

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<sup>47</sup> Gabriel Munuera, “Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe, Recent Experiences”, Chailot Papers, 15/16, Paris Western European Union, Institute for Security Studies, June 1994, p.91

<sup>48</sup> George Koukoudakis, “The Foreign Policy of Greece as a Member of a Security Community”, Paper for the 2<sup>nd</sup> LSE Phd Symposium on Modern Greece, LSE 10/06/05

this paper, both states will be able to bypass their identity based difference and build a common European future. Security community building both as a theory and as a policy prescription can serve this goal well. Further research, therefore, should be conducted towards this direction.

